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Spatial Competition and Accumulation of Public Capital ∗
Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of public capital accumulation on private sectors’ productivity in a general
equilibrium model where a public capital, such as a transportation infrastructure, aﬀects households’
disutility of moving. The focus is on indirect channels through which it aﬀects the productivity. The
study ﬁnds that the accumulation of public capital does not necessarily enhance the productivity of
private sectors when there are plenty of initial public capital or the productivity of public sectors is low.
However, it also ﬁnds that there are cases where public capital accumulation improves social welfare even
if it reduces the productivity.
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In the literature on macroeconomics, researchers often use theoretical models where government
activities are assumed to enhance the productivity of private sectors.1 In such models there is
an underlying assumption that government expenditures are used to maintain and improve public
infrastructure, or to accumulate public capital for supporting private sectors’ activities.
However, empirical researches report mixed results. As for the U.S. economy, Aschauer (1989a)
and others2 show that the capital accumulation in public sectors has a signiﬁcant impact on private
sector productivity. On the other hand, Holtz-Eakin (1994) shows that there is no relationship
between the accumulation of public capital and the productivity of private sectors when unobserved
state-speciﬁc characteristics are controlled. Then, Holtz-Eakin concludes that researches without
controls for these eﬀects only ﬁnd the fact that more prosperous states are likely to spend more
on public capital.3
As for the Japanese economy, many researches estimate the productivity eﬀect of public capital,
too. 4 However, another reason prevents us from estimating the eﬀect correctly. That is, in
Japan the central government provides a subsidy to local government in poor regions to help
ﬁnance public investment in the regions. Thus, since poorer regions are likely to spend more on
public capital, it is diﬃcult to detect the productivity eﬀect of public capital without controlling
such a region-speciﬁc eﬀect. Iwamoto et al. (1996) conduct an empirical analysis with controls
for the eﬀect. However, they do not ﬁnd the productivity eﬀect of public capital during the
period from 1975 to 1984. They interpret this result as a consequence that the central government
attaches greater importance to the eﬀect on income reallocation among regions than to that on
1 See Barro (1990) and Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) for models of economic growth, and Baxter and
King (1993) for a business cycle model, for example. Neill (1996), Devarajan, Xie and Zou (1998) and Fisher and
Turnovsky (1998) are recent researches adopting this assumption.
2 See Munnell (1990) Ford and Poret (1991).
3 See also a survey article by Gramlich (1994) for logical and econometric problems laid in the researches at
earlier stage. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) is another survey article that emphasizes on theoretical aspects.
Sturm, Jacobs and Groote (1999) is a recent example of empirical researches.
4 See Asako et al. (1994), Mitsui, Takezawa and Kawachi (1995) and Iwamoto et al. (1996) for example.
2the productivity during this period.
Previous researches, whether theoretical or empirical, typically use an aggregate production
function that has government expenditure or public capital as input.5 That is, they assume that
government activities have a direct eﬀect on technologies of all private sectors. Under this assump-
tion, we cannot analyze through what channels the government activities aﬀect the productivity
of private sectors.
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) adopt a somewhat diﬀerent approach. They use a Dixit-Stiglitz-
Ethier model6 where a ﬁnal goods sector only uses intermediate goods while public capital has
a direct cost-saving eﬀect on an intermediate goods sector, not on the ﬁnal goods sector. Then
the researchers ﬁnd that the accumulation of public capital may not enhance the productivity of
the ﬁnal goods sector, depending on the degree of market powers which ﬁrms in the intermediate
goods sector possess. Moreover, they conduct an empirical analysis using state-level panel data
and conﬁrm their theoretical ﬁndings. In addition, recently Chandra and Thompson (2000),
after examining the eﬀect of public capital on a market structure with a partial equilibrium
model, a variation of Hotelling’s (1929) spatial competition, oﬀer an interesting hypothesis. They
propose that a public infrastructure investment such as highway construction has a diﬀerential
impact across industries and regions. Then, the researchers obtain a ﬁnding to support their
hypothesis in their empirical analysis. These results indicate that public capital accumulation
does not necessarily improve aggregate performance in private sectors, while there are speciﬁc
sectors receiving beneﬁts from it.
In this paper, we theoretically examine the productivity eﬀect of public capital in depth,
by focusing on indirect channels through which public capital aﬀect the productivity of private
sectors. Speciﬁcally, combining a Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier model with a Salop-Weitzman model of
5 There also exists a model where government expenditures aﬀect private investment technology. See Aschauer
(1989b) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) for example.
6 See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982).
3retail competition,7 a variant of Hotelling’s model, we construct a general equilibrium model
where public capital, such as a transportation infrastructure aﬀecting households’ disutility of
moving to retail stores, indirectly inﬂuences the productivity of manufacturers through equilibrium
interactions. It should be emphasized that our model diﬀers from Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996)
and Chandra and Thompson (2000) in important ways: our model does not assume any direct
cost-reducing eﬀect of public capital on the supply side, while Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) do; it
considers a general equilibrium eﬀect of infrastructure investment, while Chandra and Thompson’s
(2000) can not in their partial equilibrium framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our analytical framework.
Section 3 analyzes equilibrium allocation and examines the eﬀect of public capital on the pro-
ductivity. Section 4 investigates a welfare eﬀect of public capital. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Our economy consists of households, manufacturers, retailers, and the government. Households
consume a single ﬁnal good made from a variety of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. Manu-
facturers are classiﬁed into two types, one that produces ﬁnal goods and the other that does
intermediate goods. We call the former “ﬁnal goods manufacturers” and the latter “intermediate
goods manufacturers.” Retailers buy ﬁnal goods from the ﬁnal goods manufacturers and sell them
to the households. The government accumulates a public capital. In what follows, we characterize
these economic agents respectively.
Household
Households are uniformly distributed around a circle of unit circumference. The density of
households is N around this circle and each household supplies one unit of labor inelastically.
7 See Salop (1979) and Weitzman (1982). Strictly speaking, they deal with models of horizontal product
diﬀerentiation. The former deals with a partial equilibrium model while the latter does a general equilibrium
model. We apply the model of Weitzman (1982) to an analysis of spatial competition in a retail market.
4Thus, the total labor supply equals N. If a household buys c units of the ﬁnal goods from a
retailer located at a distance i away and consumes them, it achieves a utility8 ,
u(c,i)=c − φ(γ)i, (1)
where φ(γ) is the unit disutility of moving to a store which is assumed to be related to a public
capital, γ. We explain it in detail later.
Final goods manufacturer










,σ > 1, (2)
where x(z) is the amount of intermediate goods z employed in production, [0,n] represents the
range of the intermediate goods available in the marketplace, and σ is the direct partial elasticity
between each pair of intermediates. The cost function and an input demand associated with (2)
are given as
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We assume that a wholesale market of ﬁnal goods where ﬁnal goods manufacturers sell them to
retailers is perfectly competitive.
8 The speciﬁcation (1) is the same as in Weitzman (1982). However, Solow (1986) asserts that (1) is inappropriate
for a product diﬀerentiation model because the marginal utility of consumption is independent of the character of
goods consumed. Instead, he proposes a speciﬁcation, u(c,i)=cexp(−µi), for example. Taking this into account,
Weitzman (1994) adopts the latter. However, the former is appropriate for a retail market model because it is
plausible to consider that the (marginal) utility of consumption is independent of the disutility of moving.
5Intermediate goods manufacturer
A diﬀerentiated intermediate good is produced by an intermediate goods manufacturer. When
intermediate goods manufacturer z supplies x(z) units, it requires
LI
z = aIx(z)+FI,z ∈ [0,n] (6)
units of labor where aI is a marginal labor requirement and F I is a ﬁxed labor input. We
assume that a market of intermediate goods where intermediate goods manufacturers sell them
to ﬁnal goods manufacturers is monopolistically competitive since the intermediate goods are
diﬀerentiated from one another.
Retailer
There are m retailers whose stores are located around the circle. Retailer j must hire
LR
j = FR,j =1 ,2,...,m
units of labor to set up its own store. If retailer j distributes yj units of ﬁnal goods bought from
manufacturers to households, its cost function is represented as
CR
j = pWyj + wLR
j , (7)
where pW is the wholesale price of the ﬁnal goods and w is the nominal wage. We assume that a
retail market of the ﬁnal goods is monopolistically competitive since the retailers have a spatial
market power.
Government
The government is assumed to be able to decrease household’s disutility of moving by accu-
mulating a public capital. The government must hire
LG = aG (γ − γ0), (8)
units of labor to increase the public capital from the initial level, γ0,t oγ. aG is a marginal
labor requirement to increase the public capital. We assume that γ is related with φ(γ) such that
6dφ/dγ < 0 and d2φ/dγ2 > 0. That is, the household’s unit disutility, φ(γ), decreases when the
government accumulates the public capital, γ. However, the marginal eﬀect diminishes.9 Finally,
to pay a wage to workers employed in the public sector, the government collects lump sum tax
from each household. Let T denote per capita tax. To balance the budget of the government, it
must hold that T = wLG/N.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize an equilibrium of the model set up in the previous section. We
assume that these events occur in the following sequence: (1) the government accumulates a public
capital; (2) intermediate goods manufacturers enter the market; (3) retailers enter the market;
and (4) the retailers set their price to maximize their proﬁt while each retailer’s market area
is determined by the households’ utility maximization. On the other hand, the manufacturers
maximize their proﬁt, too.
3.1 Fourth stage: utility and proﬁt maximization
We assume that the retailers are spaced equally around the circle. Thus the distance between any
neighboring retailers is 1/m. We limit our attention to a symmetric equilibrium.
Determination of retailer j’s market area
Suppose that retailers except retailer j set their price at pR and that retailer j sets its price at pR
j










/2 centered on its location. Thus
a marginal buyer, who is indiﬀerent between purchasing from retailer j and its nearest neighbors,











9 In the product diﬀerentiation literature, von Ungern-Sternberg (1988) and Weitzman (1994) construct similar
models where the degree of product diﬀerentiation is a private ﬁrm’s choice variable and endogenously determined in
equilibrium. Our model of spatial competition diﬀers from theirs in that the disutility of moving is the government’s
choice variable.
































−T. πI is the proﬁt of each intermediate goods manufacturer and πR is






















Considering (10) and the fact that N households located at each point in the circle as well
as each household in the retailer j’s market area buys I/pR









































where α = IN/m, β = I2N/φ(γ).
Proﬁt maximization of retailer
Retailer j maximizes its proﬁt with respect to its own price pR
j given other retailers’ price pR,














D  where D
 
is the ﬁrst derivative




when evaluated in a symmetric equilibrium (pR
j = pR). Hence, substituting pR into pR
j in (12) and
rearranging it, using (13), we obtain a retail price and a demand in a symmetric equilibrium10 ,11
10 It is straightforward to show that the undercut strategy that the retailer j cuts its price big enough to capture




















Proﬁt maximization of manufacturer
Since the wholesale market of ﬁnal goods is perfectly competitive and the market of intermedi-
ate goods is monopolistically competitive, from (3), (4) and (6) the proﬁt maximization conditions
for the ﬁnal goods manufacturers and the intermediate goods manufacturers are given as








respectively. Here, we use normalization such that aI =1− 1/σ.12 Thus, (17) is reduced to
p = w, (18)
independent of the type of intermediate goods, z. Hereafter, we take labor as numeraire and set
the nominal wage equal to one (w = 1). When we substitute (18) into (16) taking (5) and w =1




11 For the equilibrium to be well-deﬁned, that is, for the price and the demand in the symmetric equilibrium
to be positive, it must hold that 1 − pW [φ(γ)/(mI)] > 0 , which we can show under the condition that N is
suﬃciently large or γ is in the vicinity of γ0.
12 This normalization, which is also employed in Matsuyama (1995), is used to simplify the notation without
aﬀecting any result obtained later.
93.2 Third stage: entry of retailers
When we substitute (14) and (15) into retailer’s proﬁt, πR =

pR − pW
D − FR, taking (19)






/m2 − FR. Given n, which is already determined
in the second stage, it holds that dπR/dm < 0. That is, the entry-exit process of retailers is








From (20), we ﬁnd that ∂m∗/∂γ < 0 and ∂m∗/∂n < 0. These are explained as follows. If
more public capital accumulates, the competition in the retail market becomes ﬁerce as the result
of small disutility of moving. Thus, the retailers cut their price and earn small gross proﬁt (i.e.
proﬁt excluding the ﬁxed cost, FR). Consequently, the number of retailers, m∗, becomes small.
On the other hand, if the number of intermediate goods manufacturers, n, is large, from (19) we
ﬁnd that the marginal cost of each retailer becomes small. Thus the retailers cut their price and
sell large amounts. However, the revenue is constant in the equilibrium and the variable cost is
large because the retailers sell such large amounts. Therefore, the gross proﬁt becomes small and,
as a result, m∗ becomes small too when n is large.
3.3 Second stage: entry of intermediate goods manufacturers
When we substitute (18) into intermediate goods manufacturer’s proﬁt, πI = px −

ax + FI
taking w = 1 and aI =1− 1/σ into account, we obtain πI = x/σ − F I.
In the second stage, the proﬁt of intermediate goods manufacturer must equal zero (πI =0)




































Thus, from (8), (22), (23) and (25), we ﬁnd that n∗ is determined by
f (n∗)=σFI, (26)





N − aG (γ − γ0) − m∗ (γ,n)FR

. (27)
That is, f (n) is labor available for each of the intermediate goods manufacturer. As shown in
Appendix A, f (n) is single peaked under the condition that N is suﬃciently large or γ is in the
vicinity of γ0.
In addition, for the entry-exit process of intermediate goods manufacturers to be stable, the
number of intermediate goods determined by (26), n∗, must satisfy
f
  (n
∗) < 0, (28)
provided that f  is the ﬁrst derivative of f. Thus, if F I is small enough, f (n) and σFI intersect
with each other at two points and the right point satisﬁes (28). (See ﬁgure 1.)
3.4 First stage: accumulation of public capital
We consider an eﬀect of a marginal increase in public capital from the initial level, γ0. Using (27),
we can express (26) in another form,
N − a








11The left hand side of (29) represents the total labor supply except the employment of the public
sector and that of the retail sector. On the other hand, the right hand side of (29) represents the
employment of the intermediate goods sector.
Before analyzing the eﬀect, as a preliminary step, we ﬁrst investigate the relationship between
the initial level of the public capital and the number of intermediate goods available in the market
when the government does not accumulate the public capital at all, which means γ = γ0. Since
the government does not employ any labor in this case, substituting γ0 into γ in (29), we can
reduce (29) to
N − m∗ (γ0,n ∗)FR = n∗ 
σFI
. (30)
The left hand side of (30) is the total labor supply minus the employment for the retail sector.
Recall that, when γ is large, the equilibrium number of retailers m∗ becomes small because of the
ﬁerce competition in the retail market. Thus, when the initial public capital γ0 is large, the left
hand side of (30) becomes large, too. It means that the labor available for the intermediate goods
sector increases. As the result of the reallocation of resources, the number of the intermediate
goods n∗ increases for (30) to hold.13
Now, we are ready to examine the eﬀect of the marginal increase of public capital on the
economy. The marginal increase of the public capital has two eﬀects on the left hand side of (29).
First, to accumulate the public capital, the government must hire labor. Thus, the left hand side
of (29) decreases by aG, which means that the labor available for the intermediate goods sector
decreases. Second, accumulating the public capital, however, makes the retail market competition
more ﬁerce and the employment for the retail sector decreases. Therefore, the left hand side of
(29) increases by (−∂m∗/∂γ)FR where ∂m∗/∂γ is evaluated at γ = γ0. This means that the
intermediate goods sector can employ more labor.
13 To be precise, we must consider a derived eﬀect of the change of n∗ on m∗. To take this eﬀect into account,
we must consider (30) as an implicit function which has n∗ as its dependent variable and γ0 as its independent
variable and apply the implicit function theorem to it. After some calculation, we can ﬁnd that dn∗/dγ0 > 0,
provided that the stability condition (28) holds.
12Which of the above two eﬀects dominates determines whether or not the marginal accumulation






FR − aG > 0 (31)
holds, more labor can be used for the intermediate goods sector by accumulating the public capital
and n∗ increases. On the other hand, if (31) does not hold, less labor can be used for it and n∗
does not increase.


























when ∂m∗/∂γ is evaluated at γ = γ0. The right hand side of (33) is a decreasing function of γ0
and converges to zero when γ0 approaches to inﬁnity.14 Therefore, we ﬁnd that (−∂m∗/∂γ)FR
and aG intersect only at a point.
Finally, substituting the output level of each intermediate good (21) into (2), we obtain the














σ−1, that is, the (average) productivity of the ﬁnal goods sector increases (or decreases) when
n∗ increases (or decreases).
In the end, we obtain the following proposition.15
14 Note that γ0 indirectly aﬀects (−∂m∗/∂γ)F R through n∗ since n∗ is an increasing function of γ0.A
large γ0 implies a large n∗ which makes (−∂m∗/∂γ)F R decrease too, as γ0 directly does. Hence, we ﬁnd that
(−∂m∗/∂γ)F R is a decreasing function of γ0.
15 Again, to be precise, we must consider the derived eﬀect of the change of n∗ on m∗. See Appendix B for a
proof of Proposition 1 using the implicit function theorem.
13Proposition 1 If (31) is satisﬁed, a marginal accumulation of public capital enhances the pro-
ductivity of ﬁnal goods manufacturers. On the other hand, if (31) is not satisﬁed, it reduces the
productivity of the ﬁnal goods manufacturers.
This proposition shows that the accumulation of the public capital induces the reallocation of
resources among sectors but does not necessarily enhance the productivity of private sectors. Key
parameters are γ0 and aG. If the former, the initial level of public capital, is small, as well as
the latter, the marginal requirement of labor in the public sector, is also small, which implies the
sector’s high productivity, then (31) holds and accumulating public capital induces the private
sector’s productivity to rise. On the other hand, if both the former and the latter are large, (31)
does not hold and accumulating public capital may reduce the private sector’s productivity.16
The fact that the productivity eﬀect of public capital depends on the initial level of the capital
may conﬁrm a remark in Gramlich (1994, p 1187) that “Simply saying that some capital has
been productive in the past .... does not mean that future investments will also be productive.”
Additionally, this fact may be a reason why the productivity eﬀect of public capital can not be
found in the Japanese economy.
More generally, the results obtained in this section indicates that empirical analyses using an
aggregate production function with public capital as input does not capture general equilibrium
eﬀect of the public capital accumulation through the reallocation of input. It also suggests that a
relevant model must be constructed before empirically examining the productivity eﬀect of public
capital. Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) conduct such an analysis and their ﬁndings are useful for
considering further elaboration.
16 Note that the parameter θ is also important because its level determines the marginal eﬀect of the public
capital on the disutility of moving. When θ is large (or small), (33) shifts upward (or downward) then the range
within which the accumulation of public capital enhances the productivity of the ﬁnal goods sector becomes large
(or small).
144 Social Welfare
In this section we discuss welfare eﬀect of the marginal accumulation of the public capital. First





where ui is a household’s utility located on the position i ∈ [0,1] on the circumference of the
circle. Since the distance between any neighboring retailers is 1/m∗ (γ,n∗) in equilibrium, we can




















where c is each household’s consumption of the ﬁnal goods. Moreover, since total demands of the
ﬁnal goods, Nc, must be equal to (34) in equilibrium, we can reduce (36) to






















which means that the direct eﬀect of accumulating the public capital on households’ disutility of
moving improves the social welfare.
However, note that n∗ is a function of γ0. We notice this fact to examine the total welfare




































σ−1 [−f  (n∗)]
∂V/∂n∗ .
17 See Appendix C for derivation of (38).
15From (38), we ﬁnd that the sign of dV/dγ is determined by the sign of (1 + η)(−∂m∗/∂γ)FR −
aG, since ∂V/∂n∗ > 0 are positive. Moreover, note that 0 <η<1/4 holds18 and that
limγ0→∞ (−∂m∗/∂γ) = 0 holds from (33). Thus, we ﬁnd that (1 + η)(−∂m∗/∂γ)FR and aG







− aG > 0 (39)
holds. On the other hand, when the initial public capital is large, (39) does not hold. Therefore,
we ﬁnally obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If (39) is satisﬁed, the marginal accumulation of public capital improves social
welfare. On the other hand, if (39) is not satisﬁed, it reduces the welfare.
From Proposition 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that if the marginal public capital accumulation enhances
the manufacturer’s productivity, it also does the social welfare. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that
there are cases where accumulating public capital improves social welfare even if it reduces the
productivity of ﬁnal goods manufacturers when (31) is satisﬁed while (39) is not. This is be-
cause the direct eﬀect on households’ disutility of moving overwhelms the indirect eﬀect on the
manufacturer’s productivity.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we theoretically examine the eﬀect of a marginal increase in public capital on the
private sectors’ productivity, by focusing on indirect channels through which public capital aﬀects
the productivity. Speciﬁcally, combining a Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier model of monopolistic competition
in an intermediate goods market with a Salop-Weitzman model of spatial competition in a retail
market, we construct a general equilibrium model where public capital, such as a transportation
infrastructure, which aﬀects households’ disutility of moving, indirectly inﬂuences the productivity
of manufacturers through equilibrium interactions. The study ﬁnds that, when initial public
18 See Appendix C to conﬁrm that ∂V/∂n∗ > 0 and 0 <η<1/4.
19 We cannot rule out the possibility that (1 + η)(−∂m∗/∂γ) and aG have multiple points of intersection, since
η is a function of γ0.
16capital is scarce or the productivity of public sectors is high, additional accumulation of public
capital enhances the productivity, while the opposite is true when there are plenty of public capital
at the beginning or the low productivity of public sector prevails. An eﬀect of public capital on
welfare is also examined. If the productivity rises by the public capital accumulation, welfare
always improves. More interestingly, there are cases where accumulating public capital improves
social welfare even if it reduces the productivity. This is because the direct eﬀect on households’
disutility of moving overwhelms the indirect eﬀect on the manufacturer’s productivity.
These results obtained in this paper suggest that approaches using an aggregate production
function with public capital as input have limitations in understanding the eﬀect of public capital
accumulation. It is thus important to construct models using our approach in various ﬁelds that
are related to public capital ( e.g. economic growth and development). Besides, our modeling
strategy may be applied to new economic geography models (e.g. Krugman (1991)) where the
cost of transporting goods is a parameter and the long-run eﬀect of decreasing this parameter is
analyzed. If decreasing transportation cost requires resources as in our model, the short-run eﬀect
can be analyzed.
17Appendix A
the Shape of f (n)















2. Note that A is positive when N is large
























Recalling that σ>1 , from (A2), we ﬁnd that limn→∞ f (n) = 0. Similarly, from (A3), we
ﬁnd that limn→0 f (n)=−∞. Next, diﬀerentiating (A2) with respect to n, we obtain the ﬁrst
derivative of f (n),
















f  ( n) = 0 and f   ( n) < 0 hold, where f   is the second derivative of f . Finally, substitute (A5)















Therefore, from the above discussion, we can conclude that f (n) is single-peaked under the con-
dition that N is large enough or γ is in the vicinity of γ0.
18Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider (29) as an implicit function which has n∗ as its dependent variable, γ as its indepen-
dent variable and γ0 as a parameter. Then, diﬀerentiate both sides of (29) with respect to γ and































holds from (26), (27) and (28). Therefore, ﬁnally we ﬁnd that, if (31) is satisﬁed, n∗ increases.
On the other hand, if (31) is not satisﬁed, n∗ decreases.
Appendix C
Derivation of (38)


















































In (A8), we omit a subscript γ = γ0. The ﬁrst term in the right hand side of (A8) is a direct eﬀect
of public capital accumulation on the social welfare, while the second term is an indirect eﬀect



















2 > 0. (A11)











































σ−1 [−f  (n∗)] > 0. (A12)
























σ−1 [−f  (n∗)]
∂V/∂n∗ .
From (A12), we observe that 0 <η<1/4.
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